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This study examines the online communicative dynamics between women and men 
during the Saudi women’s rights campaign to end male guardianship, which unfolded 
on Twitter. We analysed 2.7 million tweets with the #EndMaleGuardianship hashtag 
over a 7-month period quantitatively and 150,245 of these qualitatively to examine the 
extent to which Twitter shapes and facilitates cross-gender communication, and how 
this helped engender new spaces for expression of dissent. Our study shows that 
Twitter provided shared online communicative spaces that had several characteristics 
commonly associated with public sphere(s). There is also evidence that using these 
alternatives spaces, women transcended to an extent the gender segregation that exists 
in traditional public discourses and spaces of Saudi society. The anonymity of Twitter 
offered women a safe place to deliberate their concerns about male guardianship. We 
suggest that these deliberations created a counterpublic sphere of sorts, which helped 
Saudi women legitimise the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign. 
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Introduction 
In 2016, Saudi women’s rights activists began an online campaign which was to 
become one of the most remarkable movements in Saudi Arabia and contributed to 
ending the system of male guardianship known as mahram. Part of the Saudi culture 
(Al-Lily, 2011), mahram requires women to legally have a guardian throughout their 
lives, usually husband, father, grandfather, son older than 18, or brother (Al-Saggaf, 
2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Women need permission from their male 
guardian (mahram) for marriage, travel and study; and her guardian has significant 
power over her life, including deciding whether she should receive certain types of 
medical treatment or visit government departments. The male guardian can allow or 
prevent a woman from accessing work, marriage, healthcare and travel (Al Nahedh 
and Al Sheikh, 2018). Al-Lily (2011: 120) argued that ‘since [the guardianship] 
mechanism is embedded in the [Saudi] national culture’, officials ‘may ask women 
for their guardian’s consent even where no law or guideline requires such consent’. 
There have been several previous attempts to reform women’s status. In 2000, for 
instance, Saudi Arabia agreed to sign the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In 2004, the Ministry of Commerce 
and Investment eased its regulations to allow Saudi women to establish businesses 
independent of a male guardian. But the status of women did not change, and in 
2009, Saudi businesswomen organised a campaign demanding they be given the 
rights announced by the ministry. Between 2008 and 2016, Human Rights Watch 
issued several reports arguing that legal guardianship regulation affects women’s 
rights to make their own decisions and that treating them as minors potentially 
exposes them to the risk of domestic violence due to the authority men have over 
them. 
In 2013, while defying the de facto driving ban on women in Saudi Arabia, 
women’s rights activists Aziza Al-Yousef and Eman Al-Nafjan were arrested and 
released only after their guardians were called. Al-Yousef began her campaign 
against male guardianship after this incident, submitting a petition to the Shura 
Council (the Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia). She also began tweeting against 
male guardianship. Street protests and public expressions of dissent carry severe 
penalties in Saudi Arabia, but the authorities have historically had a more lenient 
approach to protest on social media. Social media campaigns, therefore, were a safer 
way for people to express their support for women’s rights, and it was in this space 
that Saudi female activists developed their campaign with hashtags in Arabic and 
English. Of these, #EndMaleGuardianship and #IamMyOwnGuardian began 
trending soon. Although Al-Yousef’s campaign was not the first to call for a reform of 
women’s status, it succeeded in drawing much national and international attention. 
However, it was only in July 2016 that the Twitter hashtag # اﻧﺎ وﻟﯿﺔ  
أﻣﺮي  (#IamMyOwnGuardian) gained momentum, after the release of the 2016 
Human Rights Watch report. 
The campaign against male guardianship encouraged Saudi activist Hala Al-
Dosari to petition King Salman. More than 14,000 Saudi women and men signed 
their names on the petition. Approximately 2500 telegrams were also sent to the 
king’s office (BBC, 2016) in support. #IamMyOwnGuardian continued to trend 
almost daily for more than a year. After the first day, protesters drew attention to the 
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length of their campaign by updating the hashtag daily with the cumulative day 
number. On Day 302 of the campaign (4 May 2017), King Salman issued a royal 
decree to review male guardianship rules and allowed women to receive all services 
without permission from a male guardian. 
The #EndMaleGuardianship call was one of the two most noteworthy women’s 
rights campaigns Saudi Arabia has seen, the other being the #Women2Drive 
campaign, which became successful when a royal decree in September 2017 granted 
women the right to drive. In both these campaigns, Twitter helped mobilise women. 
Activists prompted users to send the link of the Human Rights Watch report directly 
to the Saudi king’s Twitter account. They also posted videos about the abuse they 
suffered from their male guardians. Many of these cases gained public attention and 
were reported on by the traditional media. In some cases, such as when the prince of 
the Tabuk region forbid the marriage of a 16-year-old girl to a man aged 70 years, the 
campaign is likely to have contributed to positive responses from authorities. This 
possibility is also highlighted by Al Nahedh and Al Sheikh (2018), who argue that the 
‘Twitter wave’ strengthened Saudi women’s movement. It also helped that the 
Twitter campaigns coincided with what can be seen as a transformative era for the 
Saudi society, resulting from the reformative Saudi Vision 2030 overseen by Crown 
Prince Muhammad Bin Salman. The timing was particularly important as the crown 
prince’s reforms called for enhanced communication between the government and 
citizens via Twitter (Al Nahedh and Al Sheikh, 2018). 
There is evidence that the Twitter wave also brought about a new form of 
communicative dynamics between women activists and men. While cross-gender 
communication itself was not new in Saudi Arabia, it has always been confined to 
private spaces, both offline and online. The women’s rights campaigns, however, saw 
such communication spilling into a virulently public space, conducted on a platform 
not just public but internationally so. It is in this context that we seek to examine the 
online communicative dynamics between women and men during the Saudi women’s 
rights campaign to end male guardianship, posing the following research questions: 
• RQ1. To what extent did Twitter facilitate cross-gender communication during 
the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign? 
• RQ2. In what ways did Twitter engender online communicative spaces for the 
expression of dissent and the constitution of counterpublics in Saudi Arabia? 
These questions will enhance our understanding of the public debate within the 
online communities in the Arab world and indicate how Twitter discourses in Saudi 
Arabia supported and potentially contributed to political and social change there. 
The Arab public sphere 
The idea of public sphere, as posited by Habermas (1989), exists but only in a 
restricted form in Arab countries. While the Arab world ‘has decades of experience 
with political argumentation at the transnational level’ (Lynch, 2003: 59) and has 
succeeded in creating a less constrained public sphere transnationally, the 
authoritarian nature of the governments and their rigid controls over the media have 
constrained the domestic space for debate within these countries considerably. There 
are limited opportunities for the civil society to formulate opinions and influence the 
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state through open debates – particularly where those views dissent from established 
norms. Not only is the traditional public sphere such that it exists gender-restricted 
to males, there are also restrictive policies on the mass media, which are mainly 
owned by the state or members of the ruling elite. Political communication is risky in 
the Middle East, but the possibility of online anonymity provides people with a 
certain safety from the authorities (Lynch, 2007). 
The question then is whether the discussions that Arab citizens conduct in online 
communicative spaces construct an alternate or counterpublic sphere to 
counterbalance authoritarianism. Poor (2005) posits four conditions to be satisfied 
in an online space for it to be considered a public sphere: (a) it should offer a space 
for discourse; (b) it should allow entry to new or previously excluded discussants; (c) 
there should be discussion of political nature and (d) ideas should be judged by 
merit, not by the standing of the discussants. Although online debates are often 
dominated by questions of religion, these spaces encourage Arab participants to 
openly discuss common concerns not just locally but globally as well, thus beginning 
to overcome boundaries of traditional state control (Al-Saggaf, 2006). A major factor 
in this is the anonymity that blogs, microblogs and online comment forums offered 
discussants. 
In the last decade, Arab bloggers have organised various online campaigns calling 
for their right to free speech. Prior to the Arab Spring, most Arab bloggers were 
what Lynch (2007) termed ‘bridge bloggers’: blogging in English to capture the 
attention of Western audiences. However, the emergence of social media platforms 
have changed this trend, with more citizens now engaging online in their own 
language. Salvatore (2013) notes the significant role that Facebook, YouTube and 
Twitter played in the 2011 uprisings, and how young Arabs used these platforms to 
criticise the political regimes and call for change. A significant characteristic of this 
new space is that, unlike the traditional public sphere, it allows for women’s voices to 
be heard. Al-Saggaf and Simmons (2014), who analysed YouTube, Facebook, 
Al Arabiya.net and Al-Saha Al-Siyasia during the 2011 flooding disaster in Jeddah, 
notes this point, even as they highlight that the anonymity of the platforms also lead 
to disrespectful comments. 
Counterpublics 
The notion of a ‘counterpublic’, as put forward by Fraser (1990), helps elucidate the 
emerging online public sphere in Arab countries and the ability for women to use this 
space to campaign. For long, feminist researchers including Eley (1992), Fraser 
(1990), Benhabib (1992) and Lanes (1998) have pointed out that women’s issues are 
excluded from public debates across the globe. Feminists have argued that this 
exclusion forces women to find ways to insert themselves into public spheres and 
become a competing public (Charles and Rohwer, 1991). Fraser (1990) suggested the 
term ‘counterpublic’ for this competing public, outlining ‘parallel discursive arenas 
where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter 
discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of 
their identities, interests, and needs’ (Fraser, 1990: 67). Such counterpublics align 
marginalised groups and mobilise them to gain access to the main public. The 
relationship between the subaltern publics and mainstream public is competitive, 
according to Fraser (1990). The counterpublics compete to legitimate sidelined 
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issues. For example, domestic violence against women was historically seen as a 
personal matter, not a public concern. However, this topic gained legitimacy in 
mainstream public spheres after the frequent discussion in counterpublics by 
feminists. 
Counterpublics, according to Toepfl and Piwoni (2017), are of two types: those 
with ‘inward-oriented goals’ or those with ‘outward-oriented goals’. The inward-
oriented debaters mainly focus on creating safe communicative space where people 
can invent their alternative identity and share their needs and interests. The 
outward-oriented groups, however, targets the mainstream public sphere by 
‘breaking up and shifting … consensus structures within dominant publics [and] 
engaging with wider audiences’. The latter groups strive to engage with the 
‘mainstream audiences’ (Toepfl and Piwoni, 2017: 4). 
The Internet enables people to do online what they cannot do offline. In this 
context, the online public spaces that have emerged in Arab countries could be seen 
as examples of counterpublics, where women have been able to articulate political 
views. Anonymity accords them the opportunity to avoid judgement based on their 
backgrounds or identities (Poor, 2005), and cyberfeminists use the Internet ‘to 
advance a political cause that is difficult to advance offline … to create intellectually 
and emotionally compelling digital artefacts that tell stories of injustice, interpret 
history, and advocate for particular political outcomes’ (Stephan, 2013: 1). Such 
activism features a lack of institutional and cultural norms: it is bodiless, which 
enable women to choose their identities, to express and write about marginalisation 
and to challenge the system of patriarchy. 
In many Arab societies, women activists are excluded from participating in the 
offline public sphere for cultural and political reasons. However, Sasha 
(2013) argued that cyberactivism can overcome such sociocultural obstacles. A 2011 
study by the Dubai School of Government reported that 83% of Arab women 
respondents believed that social media was a suitable platform for expressing 
themselves (Mourtada and Salem, 2011). All around the world, women are now 
turning their personal struggles into political matters by sharing their stories on 
social media (Martin and Valenti, 2012). Radsch (2012) argued that female 
cyberactivism ignited collective action in the Arab Spring revolution, in which 
women who participated in citizen journalism covered the assaults, mobilisation and 
organisation. Since then, Arab women activists have exploited the capability of the 
Internet to disseminate news and information and assist women in raising issues and 
forming public opinion. But much of the research on Arab women’s movements on 
social media has focussed on their roles in the Arab Spring; so far, very few have 
looked at online women’s rights campaigns. 
Saudi women and online public spheres 
Traditionally, in Saudi Arabia, there are three forms of offline public spaces for 
intellectual conversation: elite salons, cultural clubs and women’s charity 
commissions. The first two are exclusively for men, leaving the charity commissions 
as the only places accessible by women. This situation has now changed, with the 
Internet offering new venues for women to contribute to public discourse, including 
online forums, blogs and, more recently, social media channels. 
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Although Saudi women are culturally isolated from the traditional public spheres 
such that they exist, the Internet has provided those with access to it equal 
opportunity regardless of status, religious affiliation or ideological background. 
Social media has amplified the voices of those who were previously silenced and 
marginalised in Saudi Arabia, such as women and Shiite Muslims (BBC 
Trending, 2016). In addition, Twitter in Saudi Arabia performs the unique function 
of opening up social and political debate for those whose participation is otherwise 
heavily restricted (Faris and Noman, 2015). As reported in The New York Times, 
Saudis cross boundaries and discuss delicate issues on Twitter, such as ‘Saudi 
corruption’, ‘political prisoners’ and women’s issues (Worth, 2012). 
According to the Saudi Center for Government Communication, as of 2018 more 
than 17.29 million Saudis – 52% of the population – use Twitter. Of this, 62% are 
youth. A 2014 BBC report noted that Twitter gained popularity in Saudi Arabia 
because ‘people can say what they cannot say in real life’. While this indicates a 
certain level of freedom of speech online, this freedom stops much short of the 
freedom enjoyed by Western publics – even in the relatively less-restrictive online 
space, there are some lines most Saudis will not risk crossing. The 2017 Freedom 
Report emphasises that despite the online women’s activism of 2017, Saudi Internet 
remains restricted, pointing to three types of censorship that Saudi women face: 
online censorship, self-censorship and social censorship. Saudi users are encouraged 
to participate in the social censorship by reporting any inappropriate content to the 
Internet Service Unit (Aljabre, 2013; Freedom House, 2017). The 2017 Transparency 
Report shows that the Saudi government requested account information from 
Twitter 33 times, and all the requests were classified by Twitter as emergency 
disclosure requests involving the danger of death or serious physical injury to a 
person (Twitter, 2018). But relatively, it can be said social media offers Saudis a 
more open communicative space. The 2017 Media Use in the Middle East report, for 
instance, showed that 47% of Saudis considered online spaces safe for political 
criticism, and 51% felt comfortable discussing politics on online platforms (Dennis et 
al., 2016). 
For Saudi women, online spaces are particularly important. Platforms such as 
Twitter allow women to be anonymous or have alter egos, facilitating freer speech 
and, crucially, communication with their male counterparts (Al-Lily, 2011). Al 
Nahedh and Al Sheikh (2018: 5) argue that the Saudi Twittersphere ‘has served as a 
platform to reflect women’s reality by exposing their struggles and needs, including 
in ways considered risky that did not correspond to social norms’. These may be a 
normalised part of women’s everyday activities in many other countries, but for 
Saudi women, it is a new experience. Saudi women activists utilise social media to 
share common concerns and work to increase awareness about women’s issues, 
mobilise others and organise campaigns. The popular #Women2Drive and 
#26thOctober campaigns were led by well-known activists Manal Al-Sharif, Eman 
Al-Nafjan and Wajeha Al-Huwaider, who used photos, videos, symbols, street 
protests and English-language posts to promote their causes. Other noteworthy 
campaigns include ‘I am a lawyer’ (# اﻧﺎ ﻣﺤﺎﻣﯿﺔ ) and ‘women vote’ (# ﺑﻠﺪي ). 
Faris and Noman (2015) found that while many activists created hashtags and 
posted videos asking for women’s rights, counter-campaigns also emerged. They 
discovered that counter-hashtags, such as ﺑﻨﺎت اﻟﻮطﻦ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻘﯿﺎدة  # (‘national women 
against driving’), were always created by anonymous users. However, Almaghlooth 
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(2013) argued that although hashtags may have forced the government to take 
actions that addressed women’s rights, the state also followed a ‘dumping policy’ by 
which it ‘loaded hashtags of which it disapproves with many messages to divert 
attention and detract from their main message’ (Almaghlooth, 2013: 247). 
Furthermore, governments in the Middle East have also adopted surveillance and 
prosecution to counter activism. During the 2010 Iranian protests, for instance, the 
government distributed activists’ photos collected from online profiles, asking 
citizens to identify participants. The Arab Spring similarly witnessed state violence 
and arrests of protesters based on their social media activity (Lee et al., 2015). Given 
this context of fear activists in other Arab countries faced, anonymity is a prime 
concern for women activists in Saudi Arabia. This is to protect themselves not only 
from the potential consequences from those who oppose their campaigns but also 
from the traditionalists who oppose women’s rights as it allows them to target 
activists without being recognised. It is not surprising then that 50% of Saudis 
acknowledge they are concerned about surveillance, and 21% of them use a virtual 
private network (VPN) to conceal their identity online (Dennis et al., 2016). 
Method and data collection 
This study analyses the online communicative dynamics surrounding 
#EndMaleGuardianship (# ﺳﻌﻮدﯾﺎت_ﻧﻄﻠﺐ_اﺳﻘﺎط_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﺔ ), the Twitter hashtag used as a 
focal point for the Saudi women’s campaign against male guardianship. In so doing, 
we examine the characteristics of one part of the broader online communicative 
space in Saudi Arabia and assess the extent to which it provides women a voice on 
issues that directly affect them. Twitter data were extracted based on the Arabic 
hashtag # اﺳﻘﺎط _اﻟﻮﻻﯾﺔ  and the English #EndMaleGuardainship over 7 months, from 1 
December 2016 to 5 July 2017. The sample period was chosen to cover the duration 
of the campaign before and after the royal decree in May 2017 to review male 
guardianship rules, as outlined in the introduction. NVivo 11’s NCapture was used to 
extract the real-time data, which was supplemented with historical data extracted 
using Twitter’s own enterprise application program interface (API) platform, Gnip. 
This resulted in a total corpus of 2,778,228 tweets (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Breakdown of total corpus of 2.7 million tweets. 
Usernames were classified into four groups based on the overall number of tweets 
that used that specific hashtag (see Figure 1): strongly active users (1000 tweets or 
more), very active (500–1000 tweets); active users (100–500 tweets) and regular 
users (less than 100 tweets). This classification allowed us to analyse who was 
dominating campaign hashtags and the relative contributions from other users. 
From the total corpus, we filtered out all retweets (2,392,162). We also filtered out 
all spam tweets. Accounts that followed patterns of automation – identical language, 
fixed number of tweets and retweets – were considered bots and tweets from such 
accounts were classified as spam. Accounts that both supported and opposed the 
campaign fell into this classification. Similarly, tweets with content not related to the 
campaign (pornography, advertisement, sport news, religious citing from the Quran, 
etc.) were classified as spam. Furthermore, we excluded all duplicate tweets and 
identified tweets from accounts where gender was not specified or could not be 
ascertained. We classified the gender of each user account using a combination of 
Twitter’s Gender API and manual identification from the name and tweets of the 
account. Arabic is grammatical gendered language, with all singular and plural nouns 
and adjectives having masculine and feminine versions, and their usage can indicate 
the gender of the speaker in a given context. While we recognise that determining 
gender based on profile information and tweets might not always be accurate, and 
there exists the possibility of impersonation, a segregation on this basis nevertheless 
provides a reasonable indication of the extent of female–male communication. 
Furthermore, for our purposes, the gender of communicators as observed by other 
participating Twitter users and the spectacle of public interaction between genders 
were also of importance. 
Tweets containing original contributions were thus identified from the corpus, as 
detailed above. This gave us 150,245 tweets for our qualitative content analysis 
(Table 1). Following an inductive approach, we identified themes by iteratively 
Thorsen and Sreedharan (2019) “#EndMaleGuardianship: Women’s rights, social media and the Arab public sphere”, New 
Media & Society, DOI: 10.1177/1461444818821376  9 
building lists of keywords and phrases through close reading. Keywords and phrases 
identified in this stage were then used to manually code and characterise the full 
corpus of 150,245 original tweets (Table 1). Tweets were classified into two main 
clusters: broadly supportive of the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign and in 
opposition to the campaign. 
Table 1. Distribution and frequency of tweets and retweets 




Tweets Retweets Total tweets in 
corpus 
Tweets in qualitative 
content analysis 
Female users 19,486 215,529 730,948 946,477 106,387 
Male users 22,121 100,267 760,362 860,629 43,858 
Unspecified 
users 
4654 37,442 685,290 722,732 – 
Spam users 5379 32,828 215,562 248,390 – 
Total 51,640 386,066 2,392,162 2,778,228 150,245 
Tweets were further coded for the main communicative attribute of the utterance 
contained within the tweets as either ‘Rational’ (including critical argument, 
judgement based on reasons and inspiration discourse) or ‘Irrational discourse’ 
(unreasonable argumentation, including hateful discourse, cursing and threats). 
Supportive tweets within ‘Rational discourse’ were coded as either ‘Demands women 
rights’, ‘Criticism for women’s current situation’ or ‘Arousing emotions’. The 
‘Demands women rights’ were then coded as either ‘Liberal’, ‘Religious’ or ‘Vision’. 
‘Liberal’ included tweets demanding women’s rights as essential human rights. 
‘Religion’ included tweets which considered women rights as part of real Islamic 
regulation. ‘Vision’ included tweets that linked the demands to the reform plan of 
Saudi Vision 2030 (e.g. age of maturity, not minor and sane ( ﺳﻦ رﺷﺪ,ﻟﯿﺴﺖ ﻗﺎﺻﺮ, اھﻠﯿﮫ , 
ﻋﺎﻗﻞ )). ‘Criticism for women’s current situation’ blamed the state, culture, opponents 
or males for the current status of women (low, procedures, state, pearl and bossy 
male ( إﺟﺮاءات, اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ,اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن, دره, اﻟﺬﻛﺮ اﻟﻤﺘﺴﻠﻂ )). ‘Arousing emotions’ contained utterances 
linked with arousal, anger and sadness (we won’t stop, continuing guardianship will 
fall, till when, slavery and suffering ( ﻟﻦ ﻧﺼﻤﺖ، ﻣﺴﺘﻤﺮﯾﻦ، ﺳﺘﺴﻘﻂ ، اﻟﻰ ﻣﺘﻰ، رق . .(ﻣﻌﺎﻧﺎة) . 
Oppositional tweets with rational discourse were coded as ‘Critical’, ‘Emotional’ or 
‘Accepting’. ‘Critical’ tweets claimed that calling for women’s rights resulted in 
corruption, applied external agendas or disrupted how Islamic religion was 
implemented. The keywords for this theme included corruption, Iran, Israel, sedition 
and westernisation ( ﻓﺴﺎد، اﯾﺮان، إﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ، ﻓﺘﻨﮫ، ﺗﻐﺮﯾﺐ ). ‘Emotional’ included tweets that 
advocated respect for males and expressed feeling guilt for asking to end 
guardianship. ‘Acceptance’ included tweets that did not advocate the end of male 
guardianship but could accept the change because some women are suffering. 
Examples of keywords and phrases include disobedience to parents, honour the 
parents, proud of my father and individual case ( ﻋﻘﻮق واﻟﺪﯾﻦ ،اﻓﺘﺨﺮ ﺑﻮﻟﻲ اﻣﺮي،ﺑﺮ،ﺣﺎﻻت ﻓﺮدﯾﺔ ). 
The following section will explore the frequency of tweets using the 
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qualitative content analysis of the communicative characteristics of original tweets 
by women and men. 
Women accessing shared public spaces 
Evidence from this study illustrates that women are making use of Twitter to have 
their voices heard in public and mobilise support for the campaign to end male 
guardianship. While the characteristics of this public space have the hallmarks of a 
counterpublic, as will be explored in detail later, it is important to highlight at the 
outset that this is indeed a shared space between men and women. This is significant 
because in the Saudi society, public spaces are traditionally highly gendered and 
segregated, as discussed earlier. While the shared space engendered by the mutual 
use of the #EndMaleGuardianship hashtags incorporated both women and men, 
women appeared to be more cautious about revealing their identity. Most often 
activists used only their surname, for example, so as to make it more difficult to 
determine their personal identity. Despite this, user accounts identified as female 
were responsible for the majority of tweets containing original content (see Figure 1), 
while men were slightly more active contributing to the discussion indirectly through 
retweeting. 
In terms of user types, we found active and regular users contributed the largest 
volume of content across all categories – including original tweets by women. This 
indicates that this is not solely a campaign driven by a small number of highly 
motivated activists. Instead, there appears to be a broad range of Twitter users who 
contribute to public discussion using the #EndMaleGuardianship hashtags. There 
were hardly any strongly active male Twitter accounts contributing original tweets 
using the hashtag, which indicates a reluctance from men to be seen campaigning 
directly. There was however a large proportion of strongly active male Twitter users 
who frequently retweeted. 
Mapping the frequency of original tweets by women and men across the sample 
period corroborates this finding. Figure 2 highlights how women dominate across the 
entire timeline. The volume of original tweets remained high in December and 
January, averaging between 16,356 and 17,894 tweets per calendar week 
respectively. This then dips in February (average 12,304 tweets per calendar week), 
March (10,716) and April (10,340) before a significant increase in May. This spike in 
frequency coincides with King Salman’s royal decree to review male guardianship 
rules and the relaxation of regulation to enable women to receive all services without 
a male guardian. Also contributing to the spike was the attention the hashtag 
attracted from spammers, who hijacked it to promote their various services. There is 
a small peak in January, which can be explained by an incident involving a female 
member of the Shura Council. The member tweeted that activists should not be using 
English tweets to publicise ‘a Saudi issue’ to an international audience. This attracted 
protests from Saudi women, resulting in an increased volume of tweets. 
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Figure 2. Tweets over time (excluding RTs) on corpus of 386k tweets. 
Figure 2 makes it evident that women and men were interacting in a shared online 
space. To understand the qualities of this dialogic interaction – the extent to which 
women and men were having a meaningful dialogue and the extent to which such an 
online space could be considered a form of public sphere – we examined the content 
of the tweets. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate there was clear gender disparity in terms 
of support and opposition for the campaign, with supportive tweets overwhelmingly 
coming from accounts attributed to females (62.6% female support vs. 12.9% male 
support) and tweets containing some form of opposition to the campaign stemming 
predominantly from accounts of males (16.3% male opposition vs. 8.2% female 
opposition). Indeed Figure 4 shows that accounts with male names were responsible 
for both mocking (4.8% of tweets) and aggressive (2.1% of tweets) messages, 
indicating a derisory attitude towards the campaign. The aggression towards women 
and the respect expressed towards mahram in the tweets from accounts of males, 
while a small proportion of the sample overall reflect the power of men over women 
in the Saudi society. 
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Figure 3. Tweets supporting campaign by gender and themes.  
 
Figure 4. Tweets opposing campaign by gender and themes. 
Thorsen and Sreedharan (2019) “#EndMaleGuardianship: Women’s rights, social media and the Arab public sphere”, New 
Media & Society, DOI: 10.1177/1461444818821376  13 
Perhaps more surprisingly, we also see a smaller number of female Twitter 
accounts mocking the campaign in approximately 3.4% of the tweets. This can in part 
be explained by similar cultural specificities to the male aggression. It is possible that 
Saudi women are derogatory because the notion of independence from men 
contravenes the established cultural norms and values of their society or that some 
or all the accounts responsible for these tweets are trolls (i.e. men masquerading as 
women). The anger in supportive tweets from women’s accounts (8% of tweets) 
could be taken to indicate the suffering caused by the male guardianship system. 
Some male protesters also expressed anger or frustration at the system that 
consumed their time and effort (1.9% of tweets), given the level of responsibility 
associated with it. 
While what we have identified is clearly an online space shared by both women 
and men, it is clear that their communicative acts and public utterances differ 
significantly. Below, we explore the main characteristics reflected in original tweets 
where the gender of the Twitter account could be identified. 
Women tweets: the voiceless gain a voice 
Through the qualitative content analysis, we identified six key themes that 
demonstrate the ways in which women involved themselves in the 
#EndMaleGuardianship campaign. 
Online and offline connection 
First, the campaign incorporated and reflected on individual offline acts. Women 
tweeted videos of themselves walking and cycling to protest against the driving ban 
to encourage each other. Although these women protested offline, they did not break 
the law as they did not gather in groups or congregate on streets. In addition, the 
online space was affected by the offline events while the hashtag circulated on 
Twitter. The campaign evolved to incorporate Saudi women’s issues that resonated 
with the original hashtag. Participants began using the hashtag # ﺗﺤﺮري _ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻤﺘﻚ  
(#SpeakOut), for example, to encourage women to share their stories of abuse from 
violence and the difficulties they faced due to male guardianship. As a consequence, 
several other hashtags emerged, such as #SaveMariam, #SaudiWomenTruth and 
#KhadejahDied. Each hashtag represented humanitarian cases of women who were 
oppressed by their male guardian. 
The hashtag #SaveMariam, for example, emerged on Twitter as a result of Mariam 
al-Otaibi being arrested for fleeing her family. As an active campaigner against the 
guardianship system, she decided to live independently without her father’s 
authorisation. Women fleeing from home without their guardian’s permission are 
considered illegal, regardless of whether the woman is over 18 or 21 years old. 
However, releasing Mariam from detention required the permission of her father, 
and Mariam stayed in detention for 104 days. She was only released after the King 
ordered the system to be modified for prisoners to be released without authorisation 
from guardians. During this period, campaigners used the hashtag #SaveMariam to 
advocate for her release. 
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Although individuals who protested offline by walking unaccompanied did not 
face any opposition or jail time, a protester named Malak Al Shehri was arrested by 
religious police for entering a busy road (Al-Tahliya street) without a hijab (abaya) in 
Riyadh. She crossed a virtual line in challenging the cultural norms of the Saudi 
society by protesting against religion. Before her arrest, Al Shehri had tweeted she 
had decided to go out without abaya and smoke a cigarette (Burrows, 2016). Her 
actions affected the campaign negatively, leading some people to believe that ending 
male guardianship would corrupt how Islamic religion is implemented. The following 
tweet from Aldahmi ( اﻟﺪﺣﻤﻲ ) is illustrative of this sentiment (the number denotes the 
day of the campaign): 
ﻣﻦ ﯾﻄﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺎﺳﻘﺎط اﻟﻮﻻﯾﮫ ھﻮ ﻧﻔﺴﮫ ﻣﻦ ﯾﻄﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺎﺳﻘﺎط اﻟﺤﺠﺎب ، وﻣﻦ ﯾﺴﻘﻂ اﻟﺤﺠﺎب ﻓﺴﻮف ﯾﺴﻘﻂ اﺷﯿﺎء اﺧﺮى ، ﺧﻄﻮات  
اﻟﺸﯿﻄﺎن #ﺳﻌﻮدﯾﺎت_ﻧﻄﻠﺐ_اﺳﻘﺎط_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﮫ286  #EndMaleGuardianship 
[Those who demand an end to the male guardianship are the same who demand the 
removal of the hijab, and whoever drops the hijab will follow the steps of the devil] 
Moral corruption, thus, was a major reason for many to be against the campaign. 
They were concerned that women’s independence will cause family disintegration 
and spread immoral behaviour, including prostitution, and this was the second-most 
prominent criticism levelled against the campaign by both males and females (as 
seen in Figure 4). 
For their part, activists were able to arouse emotion, including anger, with their 
tweets, especially when they presented or reacted to cases of domestic violence that 
occurred offline, or when they expressed their frustration in the advanced stages of 
the campaign, waiting for decisions on their demands. 
Mobilising support 
Mobilisation is the primary result that activists hope to achieve through 
cyberactivism and is a pivotal step for action planning. Figure 3 shows that during 
the movement, calls to mobilise was very high in women’s tweets (10% of total 
sample) and also in men’s tweets relative to their other supportive messages (2.6% of 
tweets overall, but still the highest category for men’s supportive tweets). Protesters 
actively sought to keep the hashtag trending to attract and sustain both national and 
international attention. They used different mobilising strategies: tweets that strived 
to raise awareness (1.3%), tweets from influential people (less than 1%) and tweets 
aimed to arouse emotion (overall 20.5%). For their part, the counter-campaigners 
sought to discourage the campaign by creating their own hashtag – 
#AgainstEndMaleGuardianship – to group protest tweets without inadvertently 
supporting the main campaign hashtag, but this strategy proved ineffective. 
From the beginning, activists focussed on raising awareness about the campaign 
itself, stressing that the lack of a named leader reflected their shared unity as a social 
movement. They posted their intention to clarify the truth of the concept of male 
guardianship in Islam. They explained the important roles of women in society and 
how freedom will affect women positively (i.e. @noura 
# ﺳﻌﻮدﯾﺎت_ﻧﻄﻠﺐ_اﺳﻘﺎط_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﮫ156اﻟﺤﺮﯾﺔ ‘ﻻﺗﻌﻨﻲ اﻟﻔﺴﺎد، ﺣﺮﯾﺔ ﻓﻜﺮ و ﻋﻘﻞ اﺗﺨﺎذ اﻟﻘﺮارات ﺑﺪون ﺗﺪﺧﻞ أو ﺗﺤﻜﻢ أو  
ﺗﺴﻠﻂ ﻣﻦ أﺣﺪ ). Men’s tweets took a slightly different form. They tended to be more 
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conservative in declaring their support for the campaign, and often advised women 
protesters to be respectful in how they asked for their rights. Campaigners sought to 
provide intertextuality between their messages and those of historically famous 
human rights activists, by tweeting influential or inspirational quotes from the likes 
of Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi. They also reminded themselves of 
previous successful women’s movements, such as the British suffrage and the work of 
Emmeline Pankhurst, and encouraged each other to be patient and continue 
protesting. The strategy, it would appear, was to first sustain motivation of 
participants and second to gain moral legitimacy by linking to other campaigners 
who successfully fought oppression, as seen in the following examples: 
راﻧﯿﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺎن #@ﺳﻌﻮدﯾﺎت_ﻧﻄﻠﺐ_اﺳﻘﺎط_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﮫ187ﯾﺘﺠﺎھﻠﻮﻧﻚ ﺛﻢ ﯾﺴﺨﺮون ﻣﻨﻚ ﺛﻢ ﯾﺤﺎرﺑﻮﻧﻚ ﺛﻢ ﺗﻨﺘﺼﺮ-ﻣﮭﺎﺗﻤﺎ ﻏﺎﻧﺪي  
[@Rania Al Olayan: #EndMaleGuardianship 187 First they ignore you, then they 
laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win. – Mahatma Gandhi] 
ﺣﺮﯾﮫ@ # ﺳﻌﻮدﯾﺎت_ﻧﻄﻠﺐ_اﺳﻘﺎط_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﮫ180أﺳﻮأ ﻣﻜﺎن ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺤﯿﻢ ﻣﺤﺠﻮز ﻟﮭﺆﻻء اﻟﺬﯾﻦ ﯾﺒﻘﻮن ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﯿﺎد وﻗﺖ  
اﻟﻤﻌﺎرك اﻷﺧﻼﻗﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﻈﯿﻤﺔ ﻣﺎرﺗﻦ ﻟﻮﺛﺮ ﻛﯿﻨﻎ  
[@Freedom: #EndMaleGuardianship 180 The hottest place in Hell is reserved for 
those who remain neutral in times of great moral conflict. – Martin Luther King] 
Drawing international attention to campaigns 
The protesters used 10 languages – representing both attempts to attract 
international attention and their relative success in doing so. Non-Arabic tweets 
mentioned Human Rights Watch and foreign press using @hrw @BBC @CNN 
@UNHumanRights. Although there were only 762 English tweets in total, they 
gained significant attention. Domestically and internationally, the campaign was 
reported in newspapers, TV channels and on YouTube. The movement found 
supporters in many Arab countries, including Kuwait, Tunisia and Egypt. Kuwaiti 
activists, for example, organised a peaceful solidarity march to support the Saudi 
women’s campaign under the hashtag #walkingforher. As Lee et al. (2015) point out, 
social media’s ability to put national affairs under global scrutiny may result in 
international pressure on the state to reduce suppression of activism and has the 
potential to result in increased freedom. 
Interaction between the protesters and the state 
Due to the open-door policy adopted by the Saudi government in 2016, the King and 
other state officials interact with citizens through official Twitter accounts. Activists 
took advantage of this and mentioned the King with @KingSalman in 400 tweets, 
some of which contained videos and photos of women who were being oppressed by 
male guardians. Although the campaigners did not receive any online response, there 
were some action from the government in offline spaces (Alarabiya, 2017). In 
addition, activists started a petition that attracted signatures from more than 14,700 
women, which was sent to the royal office in Riyadh. 
The counter-campaigners accused the protesters of cheating and aiming for 
national instability. In response, the women campaigners tweeted to emphasise their 
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patriotism and loyalty to Saudi Arabia. They also reposted the campaign goals, 
stressing their protest was not for social instability but for social change: 
اﻟﮭـﻨﻮف اﻟﺸﻤﺮي@#ﺳﻌﻮدﯾﺎت_ﻧﻄﻠﺐ_اﺳﻘﺎط_اﻟﻮﻻﯾﮫ193 ﺣﺐ اﻟﻮطﻦ ﯾﺠﺮي ﻓﻲ دﻣﺎﺋﻨﺎ.. وطﻨﯿﯿﻮن وإن أﺑﻰ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرض  
وﻧﻨﻄﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺤﻘﻮﻗﻨﺎ وﻟﻦ ﻧﺮﺿﻰ ﺑﺄﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻮاطﻨﺔ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻠﺔ  
[@Alhanouf Alshehri: Motherland love is running in my blood. We love our country 
even if the opponents deny that. We will call for our rights and will not stop until we 
obtain all our rights] 
Increased freedom of speech 
Rational criticism was present in tweets from the accounts of both women (11.7% of 
tweets supporting and 3.4% opposing) and men (4.4% tweets supporting and 7.3% 
opposing). There was criticism directed at the state, cultural norms and the future 
vision of Saudi Arabia (see Figures 3 and 4). People were more daring in their 
criticisms and more comfortable to engage in this discourse. To the best of our 
knowledge, none of the activists supporting the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign 
were arrested for their tweets during the period of this study. In other words, the 
campaign demonstrated the ability for women to enforce a greater acceptance for 
freedom of speech in Saudi Arabia – at least in online communicative spaces, as long 
as they did not break rules in ‘offline spaces’. 
The state was criticised for its judicial and educational systems, which were 
blamed for discriminating against women and enhancing the power of men over 
women. The protesters also argued that the system of male guardianship is not 
compatible with the promise of the Saudi Vision 2030 goals. In addition, during the 
campaign, Saudi women began embracing the term ‘feminist’ for the first time, a 
label they had refused so far as it was historically perceived as being anti-Islam and 
against the Saudi culture. 
High respect for religion 
The Saudi society is considered conservative and religious, as discussed earlier, and 
religion in general has immunity against criticism within Saudi Arabia. People 
appear motivated to respect and protect religion, despite their participation in a 
campaign calling for social change. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, both supporters 
(3.3% of tweets) and opponents (0.9% of tweets) showed respect and reverence for 
Islam in their tweets. Supporters were calling for the application of real Islamic 
regulations to be adopted instead of the existing regulations, which they argued are 
anchored in cultural norms. They stressed that mahram in the Quran and prophetic 
hadith have a different meaning from the one emphasised in Saudi Arabia. They 
contended that the current interpretation came about during the awakening 
movement of the conservative stronghold and that it has resulted in the derogation 
of women’s rights. 
There was a counter-argument against the campaign too, which was also anchored 
in religion. These tweets stemmed predominantly from men and advocated an even 
stricter approach to male guardianship since they were concerned about moral 
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corruption and violation of the Sharia law. The following section looks at greater 
detail at the themes emerging from tweets attributable to males. 
Tweets from men: defending the status quo 
Tweets from male user accounts were less eclectic in their communicative 
characteristics and can be broadly grouped into four core themes. 
Attempting to derail the campaign 
The opposers attempted different strategies to derail the campaign, including 
disseminating rumours, politicising the hashtag and racial abuse. Examples include 
tweets announcing the arrest of the hashtag founder and another stating that the use 
of the hashtag is disrespecting the country. This in turn led to further dissemination 
of the fake news that tweeting with the hashtag had been criminalised by Saudi Anti–
Cyber Crime Law. The opposition group relied heavily on conspiracy theories – for 
example, claiming that the hashtag was a Western, Iranian or Israeli agenda or 
construct. Those who supported the hashtag were labelled by the counter-
campaigners as traitors, liberals and atheists, which became de facto descriptors of 
all people who demanded an end to male guardianship. Counter-campaigners used 
quotes from the Quran to support their argument – echoing the high support for 
religion outlined in the previous section. The counter-campaign blamed women in 
general and stressed moral corruption would result from ending male guardianship. 
Women from ethnic minorities in particular were insulted and accused of not being 
patriotic since their original nationality was not Saudi Arabian. 
Not daring to advocate 
Men tended to be more reserved in declaring support for the campaign and used 
loose or ambiguous phrases. Notwithstanding this, as seen in Figure 3, many 
men did support the campaign (12.9% of all tweets). They tweeted to raise awareness 
and were often seen advising protesters to adopt a strategy that involved asking for 
their rights in a more respectable manner. This reticence to advocate more openly for 
women’s rights may be in part due to the strength of cultural norms in Saudi Arabia 
and the fear of stigma that might arise from being associated with the hashtag or 
social movement. 
Men’s control over women 
While many men appeared not to be against the campaign outright, it was evident 
from their tweets that they were not comfortable with the demands of the women. A 
significant number of tweets offered alternative solutions to ending male 
guardianship. One suggested solution, for example, was that abused women could 
file lawsuits against their guardian and request changes to her guardianship. Such 
solutions, from these men’s points of view, would empower women, at the same time 
retaining the patriarchal hierarchy of the Saudi society. 
Radical demands and self-censorship 
Thorsen and Sreedharan (2019) “#EndMaleGuardianship: Women’s rights, social media and the Arab public sphere”, New 
Media & Society, DOI: 10.1177/1461444818821376  18 
Some tweets sought to exploit the hashtag to propagate (by Saudi Arabian standards) 
extreme demands, such as demanding a legislative parliament to replace the Shura 
Council and calling for the removal of the hijab. However, these demands did not 
find many supporters. Freedom House (2017) reported that Saudi Arabia did not 
request for Twitter to remove any content during 2012–2015, despite Article 6 of the 
Anti–Cyber Crime Law clearly stating that ‘producing something that harms public 
order, religious values, public morals, the sanctity of private life, or authoring, 
sending, or storing it via an information network’ is a criminal act (Saudi Minister of 
Communications and Information Technology, 2007). The report indicated the lack 
of such problematic public content could be due to Saudi Arabians exercising caution 
through self-gatekeeping or self-censorship when discussing political or religious 
topics. 
Conclusion 
This study has shown that within the Saudi Arabian context, the 
#EndMaleGuardianship campaign on Twitter engendered an alternative online space 
where women and men engaged and communicated with each other. In stark 
contrast to the traditional public sphere(s) in Saudi Arabia, which, informed by 
cultural norms and politics, isolate women from meaningful participation in political 
decision-making processes, this online space provided women the opportunity to 
debate concerns of significance publicly. But while Twitter facilitated a (relative) 
freedom to do so and fostered cross-gender communication (see also Aljasir, 
2015; Bajnaid, 2016), some interactions we identified nevertheless reflected 
traditional power disparities, with men attempting to assert their dominance over 
women. Men tweeting aggressive and mocking messages towards women indicate 
that they still resist how women are increasingly standing up for their rights and 
demanding that they share the dominant public sphere with their male counterparts. 
This is a more significant step than it might seem since the Saudi context is very 
different from that of other Arab nations (where women, for example, played an 
important role in the Arab uprisings). In other Arab countries, women were much 
more likely to be respected by men as integral to the social movements that arose 
there, some of which also focused on enhancing women’s rights. 
We nevertheless identified a shared online space that facilitated public expression 
for women on issues where they have previously been silenced and marginalised. As 
such, this arguably represents a counterpublic, but as we discussed above, the views 
expressed and the communicative characteristics are mixed and eclectic. It is, in 
other words, not a public sphere (online or otherwise) in the normative sense 
imagined by Habermas (1989) and others from a Western perspective. The 
communicative dynamics nevertheless bears many of the hallmarks of such public 
sphere(s), including a greater sense of inclusivity and presence of rational and critical 
debate. In so doing, it meets most of the criteria posited by Poor (2005). The 
‘counter’, then, is engendered in part because of the Kingdom’s narrow social and 
cultural norms, which prohibits not only women’s participation in public debates (or 
street protests to force their voices to be heard) but also the very existence of shared 
public discourses and dialogic interaction to help progress social change. 
To this end, Saudi women protesters on Twitter form counterpublics with open 
boundaries inside broad dominant public spaces – what Toepfl and Piwoni 
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(2017) called counterpublic(s) with ‘outward-oriented goals groups’. These 
counterpublics target the dominant public(s) by agitating for their ideas not only in 
public spaces but in shared spaces where mainstream audiences also participate. 
These types of counterpublics will keep their unity with the main public as 
emphasised by Fraser (1990) and Fuchs (2014). The mobilisation and awareness-
raising which clearly appeared in tweets from women coalescing around the 
#EndMaleGuardianship hashtag were maintained to keep the communication inside 
the counterpublic and push women’s rights issues onto the agenda of the main public 
sphere(s). 
It is worth noting that the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign continued for an 
unusually long period and was a potentially significant factor in influencing the 
issuance of the royal decree in May 2017, which also coincided with Saudi Arabia’s 
election to the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women for 2018–2022. Another 
connected campaign (#Women2Drive) has been even more successful, with King 
Salman in September 2017 announcing the abolition of the ban on Saudi women 
driving independently. However, the extent to which these new online discursive 
spaces will result in a meaningful and permanent long-term change – the end 
of mahram, in other words – remain to be seen. At the time of writing, while there 
have been changes within several government agencies to allow women to access 
services without permission from a male guardian, the results of the review ordered 
by King Salman are yet to be published. 
We focussed on Twitter because the nature of the platform affords a public 
discourse, though it is entirely conceivable that similar dynamics to what we 
identified exists elsewhere on other online platforms too – or that private or 
restricted group messaging services are used to facilitate and aid dialogue prior to 
participation in public debates on Twitter. Further research is therefore needed on 
other digital platforms, the motivations of citizens and how they go about 
constructing and negotiating their participation in these spaces. 
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